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I.

INTRODUCTION

The term security has many applications. No application, however,
is more important than when an interest owned or traded is determined
to be within the legal definition of security. Security is defined by statutes and applied by many courts for the purposes of federal securities
laws1 and for state blue sky laws.2 When interpreting the term security
for federal securities laws, courts have emphasized the underlying congressional purpose of protecting investors.3 State courts also have interpreted the term liberally in an effort to protect the public under blue
sky laws.'
1. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Jones, 450 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1971).
2. State securities laws often follow the federal statute and decisions closely. See American
Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App. 3d 922, 367 N.E.2d 104 (1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978); McClellan v. Sundholm, 89 Wash. 2d 527, 574 P.2d 371 (1978).
3. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953).
4. See, e.g., Goodyear v. Meux, 143 Tenn. 287, 291, 228 S.W. 57, 58 (1921) (stating that "the
purport of all such [blue sky] laws is to protect investors").
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The definition of security in the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.),5 however, has no such purpose. The U.C.C. chapter on securities is intended to establish a system of rules for those entities or persons dealing in securities. As a result, the definition of security is one
of function, rather than formality.7 This definition is the foundation to
approaching a multitude of U.C.C. issues, including transfers of security
interests.' While the definition of security appears to be simple and
straightforward, applying the definition to stock in a closely held corporation (close corporation) has caused problems for a significant number
of courts.9 Divergent results have created an anomalous situation
among the jurisdictions having the same statutory language. 10
A uniform definition of a close corporation does not exist.1" In some
cases, the term is used to distinguish corporations with only a few
shareholders from publicly held corporations.12 In other cases, close corporations are defined as those corporations whose shares are not traded
regularly on a recognized securities market.13 Another frequently used
definition provides that a close corporation is one "inwhich the stock is
held in a few hands, or by a few families, and wherein it is not at all, or
only rarely, dealt in by buying or selling."1 4 Many other definitions also
exist. 15 Consequently, the emergence of a uniform definition of a close
corporation is improbable.
5. U.C.C. § 8-102 (1987).
6. U.C.C. § 8-101 official comment (1977), reprintedin 7 W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 8-101, at 1 (1986); U.C.C. § 8-101 official comment (1962), reprinted in 7 W.
HAWKLAND, supra, § 8-101, at 2.
7. U.C.C. § 8-102 official comment (1962), reprinted in 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8102, at 14. Federal securities laws also are functional, rather than merely formal. See, e.g., Howey,
328 U.S. at 298.
8. U.C.C. § 8-102 official comment (1977), reprinted in 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8102, at 20.
9. See 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8-102:02, at 24 (stating that "[a]lmost all of the
cases construing the term 'security,' for purposes of Article 8, have held the interests being considered fell within the definition").
10. Article 8 of the U.C.C. has been adopted by every state. While 17 states have the 1962
version and 33 states have the 1977 version, the definitional requirements are virtually the same.
For further discussion, see infra notes 47-52, 156-59 and accompanying text.
11. Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 491 (1948) (stating
that "no satisfactory all-purpose definition of a close corporation appears to have been worked
out").
12. 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NWEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02, at 2 (3d ed. 1986).
13. Id. § 1.02, at 3.
14. Id. (quoting Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1965)); see also
Brooks v. Willcuts, 78 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1935) (using the quoted language to define a "close
App. 3d 713, 716, 406 N.E.2d 131, 134 (1980)
corporation"); Wasserman v. Rosengarden, 84 Ill.
(utilizing the quoted definition of close corporation in analyzing an oral agreement among all the
shareholders in a corporation).
15. See F. O'NWEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 12, § 1.02, at 2-5; W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND
TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 442-43 (1971).
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Other characteristics of a close corporation, besides limited shareholders and the lack of public trading, are rarely found in large, publicly held corporations. For example, restrictions on stock transfers are
used to protect the remaining shareholders from undesirable associations."' Because restrictions on stock transfers resemble partnership
rules, 17 some commentators have referred to close corporations as incorporated partnerships. In keeping with this "partnership" theory, a fiduciary duty is owed by each shareholder to every other shareholder."
Also, close corporations generally are smaller than publicly held corporations. This characteristic is evident in the close corporation's operation. Shareholders often are involved directly in the management and
daily business operations of the close corporation.1 9 While close corporations have many other distinguishing features, it is sufficient to conclude that a close corporation generally has: "(1) a small number of
stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority shareholder participation in the management, direction, and operations of the corporation.""0
Perhaps the most important feature of the close corporation is not
related to its internal structure, but rather to its popularity as a business form. The close corporation is by far the most prevalent form of
incorporated business. While no exact figure is available, one commentator has suggested that approximately ninety-five percent of all corporations have ten or fewer shareholders. 2 Because of the special needs of
the close corporation, many states have special provisions for dealing
with close corporations in their corporation code or have enacted close
corporation codes in addition to the regular corporation code.2 2 Because
of the large number of close corporations in existence, the treatment
afforded to their stock by the U.C.C. is of critical importance.
Stock in close corporations (close stock) often is used by the corpo16.

1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 12, § 1.02, at 3.

17. Id.; see Cuppy v. Ward, 187 A.D. 625, 639-40, 176 N.Y.S. 233, 243-44 (1919) (Shearn, J.,
dissenting).
18.

1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 12, § 1.02, at 3-4.

19. Id.
20.

Id. § 1.02, at 4 (quoting Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328

N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975)).
21. Conard, The CorporateCensus: A PreliminaryExploration,63 CALIF. L. REV. 440, 458-59
(1975); see also Hayes, Iowa IncorporationPractices-AStudy (pt. 1), 39 IowA L. REv. 409, 417-18
(1954) (stating that of the 229 Iowa corporations formed during the first half of 1952 only 2 firms
had more than 20 incorporators, with the majority of stock held by a very small number of share-

holders, often by only one or two).
22. 1 F. O'NEAL & R THOMPSON, supra note 12, § 1.13, at 61-67 (discussing the trend that
several states have enacted special close corporation statutes or chapters and other states have
been encouraged to enact these specialized statutes).
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ration or its owners as collateral for loans.2" Close stock also may be

24
issued as an incentive to encourage persons to accept employment.
Close stock may serve a variety of other legitimate and important business purposes, too.2 5 Nevertheless, in each case the method and ease of
transferability is determined by law. For the most part, the U.C.C. provides the rules for trading, selling, securing, or otherwise dealing in
securities.2 6
Thus, the question of whether close stock is a security within the
U.C.C. definition is of critical importance. If close stock is a security,
then the rules relating to its treatment are established by statute. If
close stock is not a security, then some of the explicit rules of the
U.C.C. do not apply. Consequently, common law or other statutory
measures must be used to provide the rules governing transactions in
such stock.2 7 Part II of this Note analyzes the available case law on the
issue of whether close stock is a security for U.C.C. purposes. Part III of
this Note sets forth a statutory analysis, considering Article 8, the Comments to Article 8, and the U.C.C. as a whole. Finally, Part IV concludes that a determination that close stock is a security is more in line
with commercial needs and the purposes of the U.C.C.

II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A.

The Blasingame Decision

In 1983 the Tennessee Supreme Court, in Blasingame v. American
Materials,Inc.,28 addressed the issue of whether stock in a close corporation is a security within the U.C.C. definition, and the decision represents a classic example of the old adage "hard cases make bad law. ' '2 9
Blasingame, the plaintiff, asserted that as one of the promises used to
23. See generally 68 AM. JuP. 2D Secured Transactions § 14, at 823 (1973).
24. See, e.g., Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1983).
25. For example, close stock coupled with a buy-back agreement may ease the transfer of a
business upon the death of an owner and provide cash to the estate of a deceased shareholder. See
generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 12, § 7.02, at 2; id. § 7.26, at 130-32.
26. See U.C.C. § 8-101 official comment (1962), reprinted in 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, §
8-101, at 1; see also 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8-101:01, at 3.
27. An interest that qualifies as a security will be governed by Articles 8 and 9 of the U.C.C.
See infra notes 132-48 and accompanying text.
28. 654 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1983).
29. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Justice Holmes commented:
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of
their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These
immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was
clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.
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lure him to a new job, the defendant, American Materials, Inc. (American), orally promised to sell a one-quarter interest in the company to
him at a later date if he performed satisfactorily.30 Blasingame left his
job in Mississippi and took the job with American in Tennessee for
about one-half of his prior salary.3 1 He worked for almost seven years
and never was allowed to purchase his promised shares. 2 After repeated unsuccessful inquiries, the plaintiff resigned from the company.
He sued for the value of the one-quarter interest in the company that
he had been promised, less 25,000 dollars, the amount that he was supposed to pay for the stock. 3
During the trial, some written evidence was produced which suggested that the alleged oral offer in fact had been made to Blasingame.
After one of his repeated inquiries concerning the stock, Blasingame
had received a letter from one of the shareholders assuring him that he
would be allowed to purchase the promised stock. The trial court held
that Blasingame had carried his burden of proof regarding the stockpurchase employment offer.3" Moreover, the trial court found that the
letter constituted a fraud because it was written to deceive Blasingame. 5 The trial court, therefore, ruled in favor of the plaintiff and
awarded substantial damages.3 6 The Court of Appeals ruled that the
letter varied too much from the alleged oral contract to serve as a writing sufficient to corroborate the oral offer. Additionally, the letter was
too indefinite to form a contract on its own.38 However, the Court of
Appeals affirmed on the fraud issue and held that the "willful and deliberate" actions of one of American's owners removed the contract
from the Statute of Frauds.3 9 Finally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's denial of American's motion to amend its answer made after the trial.40 This motion would have raised the U.C.C. Statute of
Frauds defense.," The defendant appealed to the Tennessee Supreme
Court.
30.

Blasingame, 654 S.W.2d at 660.

31. Id. Blasingame claimed to have been making $275 to $325 per week. His initial salary
from American Materials was $150 per week plus a bonus at the end of the year. Id.
32. Id. at 660-61. Blasingame began work after July 1969 and ceased working in October
1975. Id.
33. Id. at 662. Blasingame received a judgment for $429,000. Id.
34. Id. at 661.
35. Id. (basing conclusion on Statute of Frauds, TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-2-101(5) (1980)).
36. Id. at 662. See supra note 33.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 662-64.
41. Id. at 664. The U.C.C. Statute of Frauids, U.C.C. § 8-319 (1987), is contained in TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-8-319 (1979).
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On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court the only U.C.C. issue
was whether the defendant should be allowed to amend its answer in
order to raise the U.C.C. Statute of Frauds defense. Instead of simply
denying the motion to amend or granting the motion with a remand,
the Tennessee Supreme Court seized the opportunity to decide the issue of whether close corporation stock is a security. The court held that
close corporation stock "[did] not fall within the definition of a 'security'" under Tennessee law.42 The court stated that the record showed
only one sale of the stock in the history of the corporation. Thus, no
market existed for this stock. As Part III of this Note will discuss, the
analysis applied not only is inadequate to effectuate the purposes of the
U.C.C., but the decision also creates inconsistencies within the U.C.C.
and, therefore, should be reversed. While the equities were clearly in
favor of Blasingame, this decision creates problems for transactions involving close corporations which probably could have been avoided
without causing an inequitable result in the Blasingame case.43
Courts are split as to whether stock in a close corporation is a security under the U.C.C. and similar state laws. While Blasingame is the
focus of this Note, other cases dealing with this question must be compared and analyzed in an attempt to support the contention that close
stock must be treated as a security for U.C.C. purposes.
B.

Article 8 Generally

The question of whether stock in a close corporation is a security
within the U.C.C. definition has been addressed by at least nine
courts.4 4 While the question has presented itself in a variety of contexts,
42. Blasingame, 654 S.W.2d at 664. For the definition of a security under the Tennessee
U.C.C., see TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-8-102(1)(a) (1979).
43. See Aronstein, U.C.C. Survey: Investment Securities, 39 Bus. LAW. 1375, 1380-82 (1984).
Aronstein noted that at least three possible results could have been reached that would have
granted Blasingame the relief he deserved but without removing close stock from the Article 8
definition. The court could have: 1) affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
amend its complaint; 2) held § 8-319 was inapplicable because the contract was not one for sale of
securities, but rather an employment contract of which the stock transaction was merely an incidental part and thereby ignore the issue all together; or 3) held that § 8-319 was applicable because the stock was a security, but that Blasingame's acceptance of employment in 1969 and
performance of services for six years constituted payment within the meaning of § 8-319(b). Aronstein, supra, at 1381-82.
44. See In re Domestic Fuel Corp., 70 Bankr. 455 (Bankr. S.D.N:Y. 1987); In re Sandefer, 47
Bankr. 133 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985); Katz v. Abrams, 549 F. Supp. 668 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Zamore v.
Whitten, 395 A.2d 435 (Me. 1978); Gross v. Vogel, 81 A.D.2d 576, 437 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1981); Jennison v. Jennison, 346 Pa. Super. 47, 499 A.2d 302 (1985); Rhode Island Hosp. v. Collins, 117 R.I.
535, 368 A.2d 1225 (1977); Blasingame, 654 S.W.2d at 659; Kenney v. Porter, 557 S.W.2d 589 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977). Additional courts may have raised or passed on this issue and this list does not
purport to be exhaustive.
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most courts have been concerned with the same part of the definition.4 5
The results have been varied."' By addressing these decisions, the particular facts leading to the lawsuits may prove helpful in determining
how and why the decisions were made.
The U.C.C. was completed and ready for nationwide adoption in
1962., 7 Article 8 was amended in 1977.4' This amendment to Article 8
added new sections and changed several of the existing ones.49 While
these amendments modified the U.C.C. definition of a security, the definition remained essentially the same, merely allowing uncertificated securities to be created and governed by the U.C.C.50 Tennessee adopted
45. See Haley, Article 8 Court Decisions, 41 Bus. LAW. 1449, 1458 (1986) (stating that "[t]he
problem with shares in a closely held corporation arises out of the second of these four criteria [of
U.C.C. § 8-102 (1977)]").
46. See infra notes 53-131 and accompanying text.
47. See 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 1-101:01, at 3-4.
48. 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8-101:03, at 6.
49. Id. § 8-101:03, at 7, 10 n.6 (stating that §§ 8-108, 8-321, 8-407, and 8-408 were created).
50. See id. § 8-102, at 12, 15-16 (containing the text of the 1962 and 1977 versions). The 1962
version reads as follows:
Sec. 8-102. Definitions and Index of Definitions
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
(a) A "security" is an instrument which
(i) is issued in bearer or registered form; and
(ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment; and
(iii) is either one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class or series or instruments; and
(iv) evidences a share, participation or other interest in property or in an enterprise or evidences an obligation of the issuer.
Id. § 8-102, at 12. The 1977 version reads as follows:
Sec. 8-102. Definitions and Index of Definitions
(1) In this Article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) A "certificated security" is a share, participation, or other interest in property of or an
enterprise of the issuer or an obligation of the issuer which is
(i) represented by an instrument issued in bearer or registered form;
(ii) of a type commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized
in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment; and
(iii) either one of a class or series or by its terms divisible into a class or series of shares,
participations, interests, or obligations.
(b) An "uncertificated security" is a share, participation, or other interest in property or an
enterprise of the issuer or an obligation of the issuer which is
(i) not represented by an instrument and the transfer of which is registered upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of the issuer;
(ii) of a type commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or markets; and
(iii) either one of a class or series or by its terms divisible into a class or series of shares,
participation, interests, or obligations.
Id. § 8-102, at 15-16. It is interesting to note the differences between the two sections. The 1962
version and the 1977 version applicable to certificated securities are virtually identical. There are
only two differences between the 1962 version and the 1977 version and these differences arose
because of the creation of uncertificated securities in the 1977 version. The first difference is obvious. An uncertificated share is not represented by a piece of paper and, therefore, it cannot be
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the U.C.C. in 1963 and the amendments to Article 8 in 1986. 51
The four-part definition of security generally has been interpreted
uniformly, with one notable exception. The second part of the definition requires that a security be "of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized in any area in
which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment. ' 52 This
phrase has caused a split among the jurisdictions that have addressed
the issue.
C. Cases Deciding Close Stock Is Not a Security
The facts in Blasingame have been set forth previously. 3 In affirming the judgment in favor of Blasingame, the Tennessee Supreme
Court held that the close corporation stock at issue was not a security,
and, therefore, the U.C.C. Statute of Frauds did not apply.54 The

court's analysis applied by the court was conclusory, providing very little discussion of the actual question presented.
The court's analysis focused on the requirement that the instrument in question must be one "of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets, or recognized as a medium for investment."
The court emphasized the absence of sales of the American stock. The
court announced that the record clearly established that there had been
only one sale of the American stock in the ten-year history of the corporation.5 5 Consequently, the court determined that the close corporation
stock was not of a type dealt in on security exchanges, and, therefore,
did not meet the definitional requirements of a security.5 6 Additional
support for the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision was the fact that
issued in bearer or registered form. The other difference is the omission by the 1977 version of the
language "or commonly recognized. . . as a medium for investment." This deletion was made to
prevent some interests, such as checking or savings accounts, from being recognized as a security
because they often are recognized as a medium for investment. U.C.C. § 8-102 official comment
(1977), reprinted in 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8-102, at 20.
51. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-101 (1963). See infra note 159.
52. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(ii) (1987).
53. Blasingame, 654 S.W.2d at 662-64; see also supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
Blasingame, a one-time employee of American, was suing to enforce an alleged oral offer by an
officer of American. The offer was used to encourage Blasingame to work for the newly formed
corporation. Blasingame was promised that at some time in the future he would be able to
purchase a 25% interest in the corporation for $25,000. Following a trial which determined Blasingame was entitled to substantial damages, American made a motion to amend its answer. The
proposed amendment maintained that even if the alleged promise had been made, it was barred by
the Statute of Frauds within the U.C.C. For sales or transfers of securities, this provision demanded a sufficient writing. Blasingame, 654 S.W.2d at 664. The Court of Appeals had determined
that any writings present were insufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 662.
54. Blasingame, 654 S.W.2d at 664.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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the trial court had discounted the value of the stock because it was
closely held, and had determined the value of the stock was impaired
because no market existed for the stock.57 The court cited several cases
as support for its decisions.5 8 In addition, the court pointed out that
sales of stock were restricted by the bylaws of the corporation.5 9 These

facts and the authority of the cited decisions were determined sufficient
to establish that close stock is not a security for U.C.C. purposes in
Tennessee.
To support its decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court primarily
relied on Kenney v. Porter6 0 As precedent, however, this case is not
compelling for at least two reasons. First, it is not a decision by a state
supreme court. Second, it only addresses indirectly the question of
whether close stock is a U.C.C. security.
In Kenney, Porter and Kenney were the sole owners of a close corporation. A written agreement existed whereby, at any time, either of
the parties could become the sole owner of the corporation if a disagreement occurred. Upon notice, either owner could offer to buy out or sell
out to the other owner, and the offeree had sixty days to respond.' In
the case, Kenney made the buy-sell offer and negotiations ensued. For
unknown reasons, however, the negotiations failed and Kenney sued
Porter alleging that Porter had agreed orally to sell but had breached
this agreement. While the facts were disputed regarding the oral agree62
ment, it was undisputed that no written acceptance had been signed.
Porter argued in a summary judgment motion that because no written
contract existed, the U.C.C Statute of Frauds was not satisfied. Thus,
no suit could be maintained on the alleged oral contract.63 The trial
court agreed with Porter and granted the summary judgment motion.",
Kenney appealed to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, arguing procedural defect.65 Kenney noted that on a motion for summary judgment
all questions of fact must be construed in favor of the nonmovant. He
argued that a question of fact existed as to whether the stock of the
corporation was a security.6 If the facts were construed in his favor,
57. Id.
58. Id. The Blasingame court cited the cases: Kenney v. Porter, 557 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977); Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435 (Me. 1978); and Rhode Island Hosp. v. Collins, 117
R.I. 535, 368 A.2d 1225 (1977). See discussion infra notes 60-82 and accompanying text.
59. Blasingame, 664 S.W.2d at 664.
60. 557 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
61. Id. at 590.
62. Id. at 590-91.
63. Id. at 591.
64. Id. at 590.
65. Id. at 590. The first sentence of the opinion stated that "[tihis is a summary judgment
case." Id.
66. Id. at 591-92 (stating that "[t]he fact question allegedly raised [by Porter] is whether or
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then the stock was not a security and, therefore, the Statute of Frauds
did not apply. The definition of a security has four requirements and
the court determined that meeting these requirements was a question
of fact.17 The court determined that Porter had not produced evidence
sufficient to satisfy the summary judgment criteria. The Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure require a defendant seeking summary judgment on an
affirmative defense to prove all the essential elements of that defense. 8
Porter had failed to prove as a matter of law that the stock was a security and, therefore, the court reversed the summary judgment ruling and
remanded the case for trial.6
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Blasingame misapplied Kenney's
procedural decision. In Blasingame the court noted that the Kenney
court had stated that it was a question of fact whether the close stock
was traded on securities exchanges or commonly recognized as a medium for investment. ° While the Kenney court did establish that the
question of whether stock in a close corporation is a security is one of
fact, this determination was contained within a discussion of the burden of proof that a defendant bears when raising an affirmative defense
in a summary judgment proceeding. 71 In addition, while the Kenney
court stated that the application of the definition of security to stock in
a close corporation was a question of fact, the court did not state that
the fact question was dependent on whether the stock is traded on a
recognized securities exchange.7 ' Thus, it appears that the reliance on
Kenney by the Blasingame court is unwarranted.
The Blasingame court also cited Zamore v. Whitten73 as support
for its decision. In Zamore a minority shareholder of a close corporation
was fired from his job with the corporation. Subsequently, the majority
shareholder sent a letter indicating his desire to buy out the minority
shareholder when funds became available. This letter was determined
not to be a sufficient writing to satisfy the U.C.C. Statute of Frauds.7 '
After dealing with a complicated and procedural issue, the court addressed the question of whether stock in a close corporation is a securnot the stock in Valley Plumbing Supply Company constituted a 'security' as that term is defined
by the [Uniform Commercial] [C]ode").
67. Id. at 592 (stating "the question itself [whether the stock is a security] is one of fact").
The court acknowledged that the definition contained four parts: "[lit is apparent to us that a
question of fact is raised by the requirements set out in the definition itself." Id. at 591. The court
failed to indicate that the stock was not a security or even to apply the prongs of the definition.
68. Id. at 592.
69. Id.
70. Blasingame, 654 S.W.2d at 664.
71. Kenney, 557 S.W.2d at 591-92.
72. Id.
73. 395 A.2d 435 (Me. 1978).
74. Id. at 438.
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ity. If the court determined that the shares of the close corporation
were not a U.C.C. security, then the Statute of Frauds would not apply
and the letter in question could be supplemented by oral parole
evidence.
The Zamore court began its analysis by stating that "[i]t would
appear that the Zamore stock was not an 'investment security'" within
the meaning of the U.C.C.75 After quoting section 8-102(1)(a) verbatim,

the court, without discussion or elaboration, made the quantum
leap-it decided, without any basis in the record, that the stock was not
of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets. 6
Significantly, the court misquoted the definition when it said that the
stock was not "commonly recognized in any area securities exchanges or
markets as a medium for investment." The U.C.C. only requires that
the stock be "commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or
dealt in as a medium for investment.

' 77

The difference between the

U.C.C. requirement and the requirement of the Zamore court can be
demonstrated easily. An instrument may be seen as a medium for investment in the area where it is issued or dealt without having an exchange on which it is dealt. For example, limited partnership interests
in real estate are a medium for investment, but there is virtually no
exchange on which these interests are traded.
Rhode Island Hospital v. Collins7 s also provides support for the
Blasingame decision. Collins, an individual against whom a judgment of
over 12,000 dollars had been obtained, was sued in a proceeding to establish his ability to satisfy the judgment. During the hearing it was
learned that six weeks prior to the institution of the suit, Collins had
transferred the title of his residence to a corporation of which he was
the sole shareholder.7 9 Rhode Island Hospital attempted to invoke
U.C.C. section 8-317(2) which allows creditors to reach securities owned
by debtors.8 0 The lower court ordered Collins to endorse the stock over
to the hospital."' On appeal the Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed the issue of whether this stock was a security and, therefore,
75. Id. at 441.
76.

Id. (stating that "[a]lthough the record is silent thereon, it is apparent that the reference

stock in this close family corporate business is not of a type 'commonly dealt in upon securities
exchanges or markets,' nor is it commonly recognized in any area securities exchanges or markets
as a medium for investment").
77.

Id.; see supra note 50 (containing text of the 1962 and 1977 versions of U.C.C. § 8-102).

78. 117 R.I. 535, 368 A.2d 1225 (1977).
79. Id. at 537, 368 A.2d at 1226.
80. U.C.C. § 8-317(2) (1987) (stating that "[a]n uncertificated security registered in the name
of the debtor may not be reached by a creditor except by legal process at the issuer's chief executive office in the United States").
81. Collins, 117 R.I. at 537, 368 A.2d at 1226.
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reachable by a creditor. While recognizing that some stocks could be
investment securities, the court concluded that Collins's stock was not a
security within the meaning of Article 8.82 Thus, the court was able to
prevent creditors from reaching the residence of Collins in an attempt
to satisfy their judgments.
The common thread running through cases holding that closely
held stock is not a security is a focus on the requirement that this stock
be "of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges and markets
or commonly recognized in this area as a medium for investment."83
Two reasons appear to provide support for the decisions that stock in a
close corporation fails to meet the U.C.C. definition of a security. First,
because only shares of large public corporations are traded on securities
exchanges, the certificates representing ownership in a close corporation
not traded are, therefore, of a different type than the publicly exchanged shares.84 Second, publicly traded stocks differ from closely held
stock in the expectation of returns.8 5 Public stocks pay dividends and
the corporations are managed by others for the stockholder's benefit.
Close corporations generally rely on the entrepreneurial and managerial
efforts of the owners.
D. Cases Deciding Close Stock is a Security
Several courts have held that close stock is a security for U.C.C.
purposes.8 6 In making this determination, these courts also have focused on the language that requires the stock to be "of a type commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or recognized as a medium for
investment." A substantial number of courts have interpreted this language to include stock of close corporations. While recognizing that
none of this stock actually is traded on exchanges, these courts maintain that the stock still remains the same type as that which is traded
87
publicly.
Pantel v. Becker8 8 appears to be one of the earliest decisions con82. Id. at 538, 368 A.2d at 1227. The court noted that:
[a] common thread running through all investment securities is the reasonable expectation
that dividends will be derived from the profits which in turn are the results of the managerial
or entrepreneurial efforts of others. While some stocks may properly be classified as investment securities, we have no doubt that Collins's stock does not fall within the definition [con-

tained within Article 8].
Id.
83.
84.

7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8-102:02, at 24.
See Zamore, 395 A.2d at 441.

85. See Collins, 117 R.I. at 538, 368 A.2d at 1227.
86. See infra notes 88-131 and accompanying text.
87.
88.

See, e.g., In re Sandefer, 47 Bankr. 133, 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985).
89 Misc. 2d 239, 391 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
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cerning stock of a close corporation. The court clearly asserted that because the instruments were stock certificates, they were the type of
instrument regularly bought and sold on securities exchanges or markets. 9 The court admitted that closely held stock rarely was traded in
securities exchanges. However, the court determined that closely held
stock should be considered a security because most people would recognize this stock as a medium for investment 0
The Pantel decision was relied on heavily by the court in Katz v.
Abrams.9 1 In Katz a federal district court in a diversity action faced the
security question without the existence of a decision on the matter
under controlling state law. The district court reviewed the available
decisions and decided that Pennsylvania probably would follow
Pantel.9 2 Subsequently, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Jennison v. Jennison93 adopted Pantel, holding that stock of a closely held
4
corporation is a security.1
The Jennison court then focused on the issue of what effect transfer restrictions placed on close stock by a shareholder's agreement or
the corporate charter should have on the characterization of close
stock. 5 While these restrictions might "affect the ease and frequency
with which the stock is traded or the desirability of the stock as an
investment," the court held that the restrictions do not remove close
stock from the statutory definition of a security. 6 The court also relied
on other provisions of the U.C.C. The U.C.C. requires that transfer restrictions must be noted "conspicuously on the security" to be effective.9 The court concluded that this language clearly implies that
transfer restrictions do not preclude close stock from being a security
within the U.C.C.9 Additional support for its holding was found in the
89. Id. at 241, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
90. Id.
91. 549 F. Supp. 668 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
92. Id. at 671.
93. 346 Pa. Super. 47, 499 A.2d 302 (1985).
94. Id. at 52-53, 499 A.2d at 304. Particularly, the Jennison court announced that:
[T]he better view is that shares of stock in closely held corporations should be treated as
"securities" under Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The holdings of Katz and
Pantel constitute a more sensible interpretation of the statutory language. Shares of stock in
a closely held corporation are, after all, shares of stock, which are clearly instruments "of a
type" commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or markets. They also fall within the commonly recognized meaning of an "investment": "An expenditure to acquire property or other
assets in order to produce revenue; the asset so acquired. The placing of capital or laying out
of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment."
Id.
95. See id. at 53-54, 499 A.2d at 304-05.
96. Id. at 53, 499 A.2d at 304.
97. U.C.C. § 8-204 (1977), reprinted in 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8-204, at 130.
98. Jennison, 346 Pa. Super. at 53, 499 A.2d at 305.
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Comment to U.C.C. section 8-204 that cross references the definition of
security and states that the definition is designed to encompass the
usual restrictions placed on close stock.9
Two of the better reasoned decisions on this question have been
made in bankruptcy actions. 10 0 These decisions clearly present the arguments on both sides of this issue. In addition to their well-researched
and clearly reasoned conclusions, the decisions are important because
their factual and legal surroundings raise questions that are commercially important. The issues are important because they are likely to
occur frequently. The underlying transactions are very common business transactions and their resolution is important to both lenders and
borrowers.
In re Domestic Fuel Corp. °1 presented a bankruptcy issue which
turned on the status assigned to close stock. The action involved a creditor who filed for relief from the automatic stay of bankruptcy because
as a secured creditor he asserted that his interest was not adequately
protected. The debtor argued that the creditor seeking protection was
not a secured creditor who was entitled to such protection. 0 The facts
revealed that the creditor had sold one hundred percent of the stock of
two wholly owned corporations to the debtor corporation for 1.6 million
dollars. Six hundred thousand dollars had been paid in cash and the
debtor agreed to pay the balance over a ten-year period. The stock was
to be held in escrow until the time that the full purchase price was
paid. At the time of the bankruptcy filing and thereafter, the value of
the stock held in escrow began to decline. The creditor wanted to have
the stock delivered to him in fear that before the bankruptcy proceedings were completed, the stock would be worthless.10 3
The debtor argued that, even if the stock was losing value, the
creditor did not deserve adequate protection because he did not hold a
secured interest.1 04 The debtor argued that close stock is not a security
within the U.C.C. definition. Thus, because no U.C.C. filing had been
performed to perfect the interest, the trustee had power to avoid the
security interest in the stock. 10 5 As an unsecured creditor, the creditor
99. Id. The Comment states that "[i]f the drafters of the U.C.C. did not intend restricted
shares of closely held corporations to be covered by Article 8, Section 8-204 either is surplusage or
it is misplaced. Both interpretations are untenable." Id.
100. See infra notes 101-31 and accompanying text.
101. 70 Bankr. 455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
102. Id. at 456.
103. Id. at 456-58.
104. Id. at 459.
105. Id. at 459-61. Essentially the debtor argued that: (1) The stock in question was not a
security; (2) The creditor had possession of the stock but had failed to file a financing statement;
(3) The security interest, therefore, was unperfected at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy
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would not be entitled to adequate protection. Alternatively, the creditor
argued that the stock was a security and, therefore, a security interest
could attach without filing when the stock was transferred to the secured party or a person designated by him.10 6 In this case, the creditor
argued that a security interest had been perfected in the stock when the
certificates of stock had been transferred to the bank.
The court had to address the determinative issue of whether the
close stock was a security under the U.C.C. definition. The court addressed all of the elements of the definition. As in earlier cases, the
element that presented the greatest problem was the second prong-the
requirement that the interest be of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets. 0 7 The position of the debtor was
straightforward-to be within the definition of certified securities, the
shares must be of publicly traded corporations because the stock of
close corporations is not dealt in upon securities exchanges or as a medium for investment. 0 8 The court, however, rejected this approach. 0 9
Relying on case law and the Comments supporting U.C.C. section 8102, the court concluded that stock in close corporations may be within
the U.C.C. definition, and the fact that there is not a market for the
particular instrument is not determinative. 1 0 In addition, the court
noted "that certificates of stock in closely-held corporations are instruments 'of a type' of securities that may be publicly traded or 'dealt in as
a medium for investment' so as to fit the definition of a 'certificated
security' in Section 8-102(1)(a)(ii)."'I The court, therefore, ruled that
the interest was not avoidable by the trustee, and the court must determine whether the creditor was receiving adequate protection.
In re Sandefer" 2 raised the question of the status of closely held
stock in an important factual situation. At common law, shares of stock
in a close corporation were not subject to levy and sale under execution." 3 Because these shares were not capable of manual caption and
delivery, they were considered intangible. Most states acted to remedy
this "defect in the law" by establishing statutes allowing levy by attachpetition; (4) Using the strong arm powers of a trustee (he is debtor-in-possession) under 11 U.S.C.
§ 544(a) (1982), including the rights and remedies of hypothetical creditor, he could avoid the
unperfected interest; (5) Creditor, therefore, was unsecured and deserved no adequate protection.

Id.
106.
1989)).
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

70 Bankr. at 460 (basing statement on N.Y. U.C.C. LAw § 8-321(3)(a) (McKinney Supp.
Id. at 461-62.
Id.
Id. at 462.
Id.
Id.
47 Bankr. 133 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985).
Id. at 136.
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ment or execution. 114 These statutes generally applied to "shares of
stock. ' 115 The Uniform Stock Transfer Act (U.S.T.A.) replaced many of
these laws by allowing levy but requiring seizure upon the officer in
charge of shares or surrender of the shares to the corporation.1 1 The
U.C.C. repealed and supplanted the U.S.T.A. with a similar provision.
The U.C.C. provision, however, applied to "securities. ' 117 As a result, in
Alabama, levy and execution may be made only on securities.' 8 When a
creditor seeks to enforce a valid judgment against the proceeds of a
debtor's stock liquidation, the issue becomes clear. For the creditor to
assert his judgment in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, his execution must be against a security. The enactment of the U.C.C. repealed
all previous enabling laws that would have applied to corporate stock.
Thus, in Sandefer, the debtor argued that the close stock which the
creditor sought to levy was not a security. If the stock was not a security, then the levy and execution were not valid and the claim asserted
would be avoidable. The common-law rule of unattachability would apply because the U.C.C. repealed and replaced prior statutory treatment
under the U.S.T.A. 9
The court focused on whether the stock was "'of a type' commonly
dealt in upon securities exchanges or commonly recognized in this area
as a medium of investment."1 20 Because only shares of large public corporations are traded on securities exchanges, stock in privately held
corporations is dissimilar in that respect. 12 1 The court also recognized
that owning stock in public corporations generally involves a different
investment motive. Public corporation stock is held by large numbers of
persons, and most persons invest in publicly traded corporations for
dividend and stock appreciation. 1 22 Close corporations usually are
owned and operated by persons whose investment motives include reliance on the company as a job or famaily business. 23
While recognizing the contrary holdings in Zamore and Rhode Island Hospital, the court held that the stock was a security. 2 4 The in114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 137 (citing ALA.CODE § 7004(1)-(25) (1928) (repealed by ALA. CODE § 7-8-101 to
-406 (1965))).
117. Id.; see also U.C.C. § 8-102 official comment (1962), reprinted in 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra
note 6, § 8-102, at 14.
118. Sandefer, 47 Bankr. at 137.
119. See id. at 137-39.
120. Id. at 138.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 138; see also F. O'NEAL & R THOMPSON, supra note 12, § 1.07, at 24-26.
123. Sandefer, 47 Bankr. at 138; see also F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 12, § 1.07, at
124.

Sandefer, 47 Bankr. at 138.
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strument involved was a stock certificate, and exchanges and markets
are involved in trading stock certificates. The court reasoned that while
the public and private corporations involved were very dissimilar, the
interest represented was essentially identical. 12 The interest was partial
ownership of a corporate entity and, therefore, the stock was of a type
commonly traded publicly. Additionally, purchasing shares of stock in a
corporation, regardless of its size, was a common medium for investing
in an enterprise conducted in the corporate form.12

The court also relied on the history of Article 8 of the U.C.C. as

127
support for its holding. The U.S.T.A. was replaced by the U.C.C.

Many of the U.C.C. provisions were derived directly from the
U.S.T.A. 12e Because the U.S.T.A. covered the issue of the status of close
stock, the court reasoned that it was unlikely that the U.C.C. would not
cover all of the subject matter governed by the U.S.T.A.' 29 This conclusion also was supported by the Comment to U.C.C. section 8-101,110
which states that "[Article 8] covers certificates of stock, formerly provided for by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act."'s'
E. Problem Areas Created by a Decision that Close Stock is Not a
Security
As evidenced by the split of authority, various courts have read the
same language of the U.C.C. definition and interpreted the language to
have completely different meanings. While this result is not uncommon,
these interpretations have produced some widely varied results which
might not have been intended by the drafters of the U.C.C. or the
courts themselves. While this Note will perform a statutory analysis, it
may be useful to present some of the problems created by a decision
that close stock is not a security. An exhaustive list of the problems
resulting from the Blasingame decision is beyond the scope of this
Note. However, this limited list is presented as part of an overall argument that the Blasingame decision should be overturned.
The most frequently encountered problem is illustrated by the de125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. U.C.C. § 8-101 official comment (1962), reprintedin 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8101, at 1.
129. Sandefer, 47 Bankr. at 138-39.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 138 (emphasis omitted). The Official Statement of Reasons for 1977 Changes in
Official Text states: "The remaining language of subparagraph (ii) is intended to cover such interests as the stock of closely held corporations which, although not in fact dealt in on exchanges or
markets, is 'of a type' that is." U.C.C. § 8-102 official statement (1977), reprinted in 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8-102, at 19.
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cisions in Blasingame and Kenney. According to the U.C.C. Statute of
Frauds, a writing is required before the sale of a security may be enforced."3 2 The mere oral assertion of a contract by a party will not be
enforceable.""3 The decision that close stock is not a security, therefore,
will allow the evasion of the statutory directive which requires a writing
in order to enforce a contract for the sale of a security. Thus, in an area
of commercial law in which written documentation will provide certainty and reliability, the Statute of Frauds may be avoided. A second
problem is illustrated by the facts in Rhode Island Hospital. While a
security of a debtor may be pursued by his creditor under the U.C.C. as
an easy method to satisfy a judgment,' if the stock is not a security
within the U.C.C., then this statutorily provided avenue of relief is not
available to the creditor.
Perhaps the most important question presented by these cases involves the perfection of security interests. Virtually all small corporations must receive credit in order to survive. Loans and credit
arrangements are facilitated when creditors are allowed to take a security interest in the corporation and, thereby, protect themselves. 3

5

A

common method for protection is to take a security interest in the
shareholders' stock. Thus, when a potential lender decides to attach a
security interest to the shares of the corporation, he merely takes possession of certificated shares or for uncertificated shares, he merely
makes a notation on the corporate books. 3 6 Perfection is possible without filing or the existence of a written security agreement.'
Yet, the creditor faces uncertainty if he desires a security interest
in the shares of stock of a close corporation. In states which determine
that close stock is not a security, like Tennessee, the creditor also must
file to protect his security interest. Security interests may be secured by
mere possession on certain types of collateral.

38

Possession is not suffi-

132. U.C.C. § 8-319 (1987).
133. See Jennison, 346 Pa. Super. at 53, 499 A.2d at 305.
134. U.C.C. § 8-317 (1987).
135. See id. § 9-101 official comment.
136. Id. § 8-321(1) (stating "[a] security interest in a security is enforceable and can attach
only if [the security] is transferred to the secured party or [his agent]"); see id. § 8-321(3); see also
7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8-101:03, at 6.
137. U.C.C. § 8-321(3) (1987).
138. Id. § 9-305. Section 9-305 of the U.C.C. states that:
A security interest in letters of credit and advices of credit (subsection (2)(a) of Section 5116), goods, instruments (other than certificated securities), money, negotiable documents, or
chattel paper may be perfected by the secured party's taking possession of the collateral. If
such collateral other than goods covered by a negotiable document is held by a bailee, the
secured party is deemed to have possession from the time the bailee receives notification of
the secured party's interest. A security interest is perfected by possession from the time possession is taken without a relation back and continues only so long as possession is retained,
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cient for a security interest in other types of property. 13 9 By the process
of elimination, if stock in a close corporation is not a security, it is a
general intangible.' 40 In order to perfect a security interest in a general
intangible, not only must the creditors take possession, but they also
must file the required financing statement. 141 If the holder of a stock
fails to file the required statement, his interest is subject to attack.
Other creditors cannot perfect a security interest in the stock without
possession, but a trustee in bankruptcy might attack the secured status
1 42
of the claim.
Another problem that arises when close stock is not a U.C.C. security was presented in In re Sandefer. Proper execution of a judgment
requires that execution be issued against the property. 14 According to
common law, shares of stock in a corporation were not tangible and,
therefore, not available for execution.14 4 While statutes had been implemented to allow execution on stock, the U.C.C. repealed all of these
statutes. 45 As a result, the decision that close stock is not a security
removes this stock from the U.C.C. execution provisions. As a result, no
statute applies that addresses the ability of creditors to levy and execute on these interests. Thus, these shares are free from execution in
the absence of a new statute that enables creditors to levy and execute
46
upon this property.
While the problems presented by the Blasingame decision are not
insurmountable, they are clearly avoidable. As a practical matter, the
courts which determine that close corporation stock is a security seem
to have made the wisest choice. Their logic and rationale seems to be
more in depth than those courts which hold that the close stock is not a
unless otherwise specified in this Article. The security interest may be otherwise perfected as
provided in this Article before or after the period of possession by the secured party.

Id.
139. See id. § 9-305 official comment (stating "[tihis section permits a security interest to be
perfected by transfer of possession only when the collateral is goods, instruments (other than certificated securities, which are governed by Section 8-321), documents or chattel paper: that is to
say, accounts and general intangibles are excluded"); see also id. § 9-105(h) (definition of goods);
id. § 9-105(i) (definition of instruments); id. § 9-105(f) (definition of documents); id. § 9-105(b)
(definition of chattel paper). General intangibles are defined in U.C.C. § 9-106 and it is a "catchall." See id. § 9-106 official comment.
140. Id. § 9-106 (stating that "'[g]eneral intangibles' means any personal property (including
things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and other
money").
141. Id. § 9-401.
142. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 112-31 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 112-34 and accompanying text.
145. See U.C.C. § 8-101 official comment (1962), reprintedin 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6,
§ 8-101, at 1; see also Sandefer, 47 Bankr. at 138.
146. See supra notes 112-34 and accompanying text.
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security. Additionally, the U.C.C. specifically was designed to deal with
the problems presented when persons deal in stocks and evidences of
indebtedness. 14 7 The U.C.C. is the law in fifty states'4 8 and represents
the will of the legislature. As a result, the courts interpreting the U.C.C.
should be aware of its goals and purposes when they decide issues covered by the U.C.C. The problems presented in this Note should be
solved by the U.C.C. in accordance with its purposes. The questions
presented should be analyzed not only by a statutory reading but also
by the Comments and purposes contained within the Code as expressed
by its drafters.
III.
A.

STATUTORY ANALYSIS
Statutory History

The cases interpreting the U.C.C. definition of security provide a
glimpse of the statutory language. Additionally, several courts have relied on the Comments which accompany the U.C.C. for guidance. In
some of the cases, the courts have looked to the purpose of the U.C.C.
or how previous statutes treated shares of stock and related transactions. Nevertheless, the starting point for any interpretation must be
the definition of security contained in Article 8.149 This section will
scrutinize the statutory language involved. It also will review the Official Comments to the U.C.C., their treatment of this issue, and how the
Comments generally are weighed by courts. Finally, this section will
discuss the overall purpose of the U.C.C. and suggest some approaches
to interpreting the U.C.C. as a code, rather than as a statute. These
approaches attempt to provide support for the underlying thesis of this
Note-stock in a close corporation meets the U.C.C. definition of a
security.
As previously indicated, two versions of Article 8 of the U.C.C. ex150
ist. The 1977 version of the Article 8 definition varies slightly from its
predecessor. The amendment was made in order to meet the needs of
securities dealers and exchanges. 151 Because of the increase in the
amount of shares that were being traded, a "paper crunch" had occurred. Consequently, the industry needed a way to regulate the trading
of paperless securities, or those securities traded only on books without
147.

See U.C.C. § 8-101 official comment (1962), reprinted in 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6,

§ 8-101, at 1.
148. All 50 states have adopted Article 8, while only Louisiana has not adopted Article 9.
UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, 2A U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1988).
149. U.C.C. § 8-102 (1987). For the full text of the 1962 and 1977 versions, see supra note 50.
150. See supra note 10.
151. See 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8-101:03, at 6-7.
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requiring the actual delivery of the instruments.1 52 The 1977 amendments created an "uncertificated security." 153 While the definition of a
security was modified to incorporate and to allow for this development,
the other requirements of a security essentially remained unchanged.
The 1977 definition remains virtually identical to the 1962 definition. Nevertheless, the second part of the definition of a security has
been changed. Under the 1962 definition, securities included those of a
type dealt in on exchanges or commonly recognized as a medium for
investment. The 1977 version had the same requirement for "certificated securities." However, the definition for uncertificated securities
was narrowed. The "commonly recognized. . . as a medium for investment" requirement was deleted because the drafters of the 1977
amendments desired to exclude certain uncertificated interests that
otherwise might be regarded as a medium for investments.1 54 An example of such an interest would be bank checking or savings accounts.
These interests are recognized as a medium for investment, but they
are not of a type commonly traded on the exchanges. 55
B.

Official Comments to the U.C.C.
1.

In General

Following each section of the U.C.C., the drafters included comments which elaborate on the particular statutory provisions. In the
1977 amendments, a reason for the change is given, in addition to the
Official Comments. 5 6 Because the Official Comments were written by
57
the drafters of the U.C.C., they are invaluable aids to interpretation.
Case law suggests that courts are influenced by the Comments more
than any other factor, except for decided cases on the same issue.1 58
The Comments often are included in state codes, but they are not part
of the legislative enactment of the U.C.C.15 9
152. Id. § 8-101:03, at 6.
153. Id. § 8-102:07, at 33.
154. See U.C.C. § 8-102 official comment, official statement (1977), reprinted in 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8-102, at 19, 20.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8-101, at 2.
157. See 1 id. § 1-101:02, at 4-6.
158. Id. § 1-102:10, at 34.
159. An interesting example of this phenomenon was discovered as this Note was being
researched. The 1962 U.C.C. enacted by the Tennessee Legislature in 1963 was passed without the
Comments. See 1963 Tenn. Pub. Acts 243. However, the official codification of Tennessee statutes,
Tennessee Code Annotated, included the Comments along with the Code. See TENN. CODE ANN. §
47-1-101 (1963). The 1977 version enacted in 1986 also was presented and passed without the
Comments. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-101 (Supp. 1986). The official codification in Tennessee
Code Annotated did not include the 1977 Comments or the Official Reasons for Changes in 1977
Official Text. After much research and inquiry the Author called the Tennessee Code Commission.
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As a general rule, the language of the U.C.C., if clear and unambiguous, will be followed without resort to the Comments."'0 However, if
the statute is unclear, most courts will seek assistance from the Comments. 16 1 Some courts only look to the Comments with questions of first
impression.16 2 Other courts use the Comments as any type of legislative
history would be used.6 "
The Comments, however, are not followed with blind allegiance.
For example, at least two courts have refused to follow the Comments.
In Simmons v. Clemco Industries'" the Alabama Supreme Court decided not to follow the Comments. The court held that while the Comments are a valuable aid in construction, they have not been enacted by
the legislature and, therefore, are not necessarily representative of legislative intent. 6 ' Similarly, in American National Bank v. Christensen,16 6 a Colorado appellate court refused to follow the Comments. The
court concluded that no presumption or implication of legislative intent
may be drawn from the Comments because the Comments are not part
of the U.C.C. as enacted in Colorado.6 7 Some courts also have refused
to follow a Comment if they feel it is wrong or if the statutory language
is clear and a resort to the Comments would be superfluous.'
All courts should review the U.C.C. Comments in order to clarify
The Commission is a legislative committee established to oversee the publication of the Tennessee
Code Annotated. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-1-101 (1985). After a discussion with staff attorneys, one of
whom was responsible for the drafting of the 1986 bill which included the 1977 amendment, no
conclusory answer was found. No one currently at the Commission was working there when the
1962 U.C.C. was passed. Thus, no one knew why the Official Comments were included. One staff
attorney suggested that when the 1962 U.C.C. was passed it was relatively new. The Commission,
therefore, might have included the Comments in order to provide some assistance to judges and
practitioners in interpreting the Code. But when the 1977 version was codified in 1986, most persons were more familiar with the U.C.C. Additionally, commercial U.C.C. reporters' and commentators' opinions exist and are more readily available than they were in 1962. Another suggestion
was that because the 1986 enactment is contained in a pocket part supplement, cost might have
been a factor for the Commission. A full code along with Comments and Reasons for Changes
might have forced a new volume instead of allowing the pocket part supplement. At any rate, the
Commission could have included the Comments, but they were not discussed by the Commission
when it discussed publication of the 1986 U.C.C. amendments. Telephone interview with Sally
Swainey, Staff Attorney for the Tennessee Code Commission (Feb. 25, 1988).
160. See 7 W. HAwKLAND, supra note 6, § 1-101:02, at 6.
161. See, e.g., In re Augustin Bros. Co., 460 F.2d 376, 380 (8th Cir. 1972); Farley v. Clark
Equip. Co., 484 S.W.2d 142, 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (stating "[w]hile the Comment... does not
rise to the level of judicial precedent, it does present assistance in attempting to clarify and ascertain the meaning to be given to the particular [C]ode section").
162. In re Rivet, 299 F. Supp. 374, 376 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
163. 7 W. HAwKLAND, supra note 6, § 1-102:10, at 34.
164. 368 So. 2d 509 (Ala. 1979).
165. Id. at 514.
166.

28 Colo. App. 501, 476 P.2d 281 (1970).

167. Id. at 510, 476 P.2d at 286.
168.

See, e.g., Burk v. Emmick, 637 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1971).
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the requirements of the U.C.C. definition of a security. Particularly, the
requirement that shares be "of a type" or "commonly recognized"
should be resolved by reference to the Comments. This language raises
the only recurring question within the U.C.C. definition of a security on
which courts have not agreed. 169 When addressing this question, courts
should use the Comments as an interpretive aid.
While no Tennessee decision has outlined specifically when resort
to the Comments is proper, many Tennessee courts have used the Comments to settle questions of legislative intent or for other interpretive
purposes.17 Additionally, provisions of the U.C.C. found in Article 1
imply a duty to interpret the Code as a whole. 1 7' Resort to the Comments seems to further this goal. 1 2 Those scholars who drafted and
amended the U.C.C. provided a somewhat uniform approach to commercial law. Thus, their thoughts concerning the legislation which they
drafted seem necessary in order to preserve its uniformity and consistency.'7 3 Finally, no legislative history generated by the Tennessee legislature exists for this statute. If legislative intent is of any merit,
therefore, then the Comments are the only available source of such
intent.
2.

Official Comments to Article 8

The Comments to Article 8 clearly indicate its purpose. Article 8
"is intended to govern the relationships, rights and duties of the issuers
of and the parties that deal with both certificated and uncertificated
securities.' 74 Essentially, the provision is a negotiable instruments law
dealing with securities. Article 8 sets forth the rights and duties of parties dealing with such instruments.' 75 Unlike a corporation code, Article
8 does not define any rights that might exist for holders. 76 Rather, it
establishes rules governing the transfer of the rights that constitute securities and the establishment of these rights by the holder.' 77
Article 8 is not a blue sky law and it does not establish require169. 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8-102:02, at 24-26.
170. Many Tennessee courts have resorted to use of the Comments in their decisions. See,
e.g., Third Nat'l Bank v. Highlands Ins. Co., 603 S.W.2d 730 (Tenn. 1980); Continental Bankers
Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Alamo, 578 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. 1979); International Harvester Co. v. Carr,
225 Tenn. 244, 466 S.W.2d 207 (1971).
171. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1987).
172. 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 1-101:02, at 5-6.
173.

174.
101, at 2.
175.
101, at 1.
176.
177.

Id.

U.C.C. § 8-101 official statement (1977), reprintedin 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6,

§ 8-

U.C.C. § 8-101 official comment (1962), reprinted in 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6,

§ 8-

U.C.C. § 8-101 official comment (1987).
Id.
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ments for disclosure to the public.17 8 The definition provided is unique
in that it is exclusive of any definition of that term appearing in federal
or state blue sky laws. 17 9 As an essential part of the U.C.C., the Article
8 security definition is included specifically in Article 9.180 The definition is functional rather than formal. The drafters of the Code designed
it to cover anything that securities markets are likely to regard as suitable for trading. 8 1 This definition includes the over-the-counter markets, as well as the organized exchanges. 8 2
The Official Comment to section 8-101 in the 1962 version of the
U.C.C. clearly states that Article 8 is to deal with certificates of stock
formerly covered by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act (U.S.T.A.). 8 s The
U.S.T.A. clearly provided that stock in close corporations was governed
by its terms. 8 4 Thus, when the U.C.C. replaced the U.S.T.A., it was
intended to govern those instruments that previously had been covered
by the U.S.T.A. While it must be acknowledged that the clear language
of the U.C.C. never states expressly that stock of close corporations is
within its definition, the implication appears clear.'
The 1977 version, however, attempted to clear up the controversy.
The stated reasons for the changes, as well as the Official Comment,
specifically address the close corporation issue. "The. . . language...
is intended to cover such interests as the stock of closely held corporations which, although not in fact dealt in on exchanges or markets, is 'of
a type' that is."' 8 8 The drafters, recognizing that certain courts followed
rationale, inserted the Comments to clarify their posithe Blasingame
tion. 8 7 The language "of a type' u 8 is the part of the definition that
allows closely held stock to fall within its parameters. If this language
were omitted, the definition of a security only would encompass stock
that was "commonly dealt in on securities exchanges." The "of a type"
language allows non-traded securities to be within the definition and,
therefore, to be controlled by the U.C.C., specifically Articles 8 and 9.
178. U.C.C. § 8-101 official comment (1977), reprinted in 7 W. HAWKLAND,
101, at 2.
179. U.C.C. § 8-101 official comment (1987).
180. See 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8-101:01, at 3.
181. See id.
182. U.C.C. § 8-102 official comment (1987).
183. U.C.C. § 8-101 official comment (1962), reprintedin 7 W. HAWKLAND,
101, at 1.
184. See Sandefer, 47 Bankr. at 137; see also Uniform Stock Transfer
7004(1)-(5) (1928).
185. Sandefer, 47 Bankr. at 138-39.
186. U.C.C. § 8-102 official statement (1977), reprintedin 7 W. HAWKLAND,
102, at 19.
187. U.C.C. § 8-102 official comment (1987).
188. Id. § 8-102(a)(ii).

supra note 6,

§ 8-

supra note 6,

§

8-

Act, ALA. CODE

§

supra note 6, § 8-
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Other language within this prong of the test adds additional support for the contention that close stock is a security. Stock in a close
corporation is "commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or
dealt in as a medium for investment."' 8 9 This area of issuance or dealing might differ somewhat from the area of publicly traded stocks. Investments in close corporations generally require more personal
involvement. 190 The expectation of profit in a public corporation is
more likely to result from dividends, while in close corporations the expectation of profit usually is from salary and capital appreciation. 9 ' As
the area of large corporate stock presents its own expectation of profit,
so does the area of close stock. Both represent an investment by the
192
holder of the stock.
Failure to recognize close stock as a security merely because it is
not traded produces another very undesirable result. Under Blasingame, when trading has never or has rarely occurred, then the instrument is not a security. 93 However, when the number of shareholders or
sales and exchanges has increased, the stock becomes a security. 94 This
increase allows for the stock to be governed by the U.C.C. although it
previously was not. The treatment and rules change, but the nature of
the underlying instrument remains the same. Furthermore, restrictions
placed on the shares could take the shares outside the U.C.C. definition
of a security. This result, in effect, would allow the shareholders to remove the instrument from U.C.C. coverage merely by placing restrictions on its resale. This approach would permit persons to dictate the
treatment accorded to their interests, notwithstanding a complex legislative enactment providing for a uniform set of rules. It also would create a lack of uniformity of treatment among holders of similar
instruments and allow the chance to manipulate legal rights associated
with close stock. The language of the U.C.C., however, clearly reveals
that restrictions should not remove the interests from the definition of
1 95
a security.
3.

Interpreting the U.C.C. as a Whole

While this Note does not attempt to provide a detailed discussion
on how to interpret the U.C.C., some discussion of this topic further
augments the argument that close stock should be deemed a security
189.
190.

Id.
1 F. O'NEAL & R THOMPSON, supra note 12, § 1.07, at 25-26.

191. Id.
192.

Sandefer, 47 Bankr. at 138.

193. Blasingame, 654 S.W.2d at 664.
194. 7 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 8.102:02, at 25.
195. Id. § 8-102:02, at 26.
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for U.C.C. purposes.19 6 Official Comments follow each U.C.C. section.
These Comments were drafted at the same time as the Code, and often
contain cross references to other relevant sections. Most Comments at197
tempt to explain the purposes and policies of the relevant section.
They also might differentiate the U.C.C. from pre-Code law and explain
the reason for the change. 98 The Comments have been described as
"indispensable features." ' They serve the goal of uniformity by emphasizing the Code as a whole through the use of cross references. °0
The U.C.C. is designed as a uniform code to clarify the commercial
law and to encourage certainty in commercial transactions.2 1 Section 1102 of the U.C.C. clearly states that the Code should be construed liberally and applied to promote its underlying policies and purposes. 0 2
Those policies include simplifying and modernizing the law governing
commercial transactions, allowing the expansion of commercial practices, and making the law uniform in all jurisdictions.20 3 Commentators
have argued that the U.C.C., through sections 1-102, 1-103, and 1-104,
20 4
replaced the common-law method with the civil-law method.
Whether or not this suggested change in method is accurate, the U.C.C.
clearly attempts to cover all commercial transactions in a complete,
comprehensive, and uniform manner.20 5
Because the U.C.C. is a code, it should be interpreted somewhat
differently than by the standard legal method. 20 6 First, courts should
use analogy rather than outside law in order to fill gaps in the Code. 0 7
Second, courts should investigate other jurisdictions' decisions. 208 Finally, courts should give their own decisions less precedential value. 209
Even if some courts refuse to recognize that the U.C.C. differs from
other statutes, it has been interpreted by code methodology in many
196. For a full discussion, see 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, §§ 1-101:01 to -102:09, at 2-33.
For further discussion, see Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.P.
291, and Hawkland, Article 9 Methodology, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 531 (1963).
197. 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 1-101:02, at 6.
198. Id.
199. Id.

200. Id.
201. Id. § 1-102:03, at 13-17.
202. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1987).
203. Id.
204. See Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330, 333 (1951).
205. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1987).
206. 1 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 1-102:01, at 11; id. § 1-102:02, at 12-13.
207. Id. § 1-102:02, at 12.
208. Cf. id. § 1-102:02, at 13 (stating that "cases decided under [the Code] may be interesting, persuasive, cogent, but each new case must be referred for decision to the undefiled [C]ode
text").
209. Id. § 1-102:06, at 29.

1989]

CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION

605

cases. 2 OWhen interpreting the U.C.C., courts generally have followed
the mandate of section 1-102 and construed the U.C.C. liberally. 2"
Courts also have relied on case law, Comments to the Code, legislative
history, and legal literature when interpreting specific U.C.C.
provisions.21 2
Regardless of whether recognition of the U.C.C. as a code occurs,
the U.C.C. is unusual because it provides how courts are to construe its
provisions..2 1 The Comments to Article I suggest that the courts should
use a two-tiered policy analysis when addressing an issue. 214 Initially,
the court should determine the specific policy behind the particular section, as evidenced by the language of and Comments to the section.
Then, support for the decision should be drawn from the general policy
of the Code. 15
Thus, in deciding whether stock in a close corporation is a security,
a court first should examine the specific language of section 8-102 and
its Comments. The Comments provide that the purpose of the definition of a security is to identify those instruments that are governed by
section 8-102.216 The definition was meant to be a functional, working
definition. Coverage of the definition should include those instruments
that are likely to be traded.217 The overall purpose of the U.C.C. is to
foster certainty in transactions and encourage sound business practices. 2 18 Because a finding that close stock is not a security promotes
neither of these policies, this finding should not be reached. As a security, certain rules are in place to deal with transactions that commonly
involve close stock. As a general practice, persons holding close stock
want certainty in their transactions because the stock is an important
asset which they may use for a variety of purposes. Thus, from an interpretive standpoint, classifying close stock as a security is clearly in
keeping with the U.C.C. policies of promoting certainty and encouraging sound business practices.
IV. CONCLUSION
Central to the application of a statute is the definition of its terms.
The definition of a security 219 under the U.C.C. is the focus of attention
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. § 1-102:10, at 33.
Id. § 1-102:10, at 34.
Id.
Id. § 1-102:10, at 33-35.
Id. § 1-102:11, at 38.
U.C.C. § 1-102 official comment (1987).
Id. § 8-102 official comment.
Id.
See id. § 1-102.
Id. § 8-102.
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when shares of stock in a close corporation are involved. To be a security, and thus fall within the statutory scheme of the U.C.C., all the requirements of the U.C.C. definition must be met.
In Blasingame and a few other cases, the status of security has
been denied to shares of stock in a close corporation. This determination solely rested on an interpretation of the second part of the U.C.C.
definition. This prong demands that the instrument be "of a type" commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets, or commonly recognized as a medium for investment in the area in which it is issued. 220
While these decisions to deny security status to close stock might have
been appropriate to reach an equitable result, they have created an
anomaly among jurisdictions that have enacted the U.C.C. The U.C.C.
was designed to simplify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions, to allow expansion of commercial practices, and to make
the law among the jurisdictions uniform. 221 The cases which hold that
close stock is not a U.C.C. security fail to promote any of these goals.
The decisions which hold that close stock is a security are more in
line with the needs of organized commerce and the purposes of the
U.C.C. These decisions are better reasoned and do not require such a
strained reading of the statute. They also allow the U.C.C. to govern
the instruments, thereby preventing a gap in the law of one jurisdiction
and encouraging conformity among jurisdictions. Additionally, these decisions provide the greatest support for the dictates of the U.C.C., that
the law be construed and applied liberally in order to promote its underlying goals.2 22 Uniform coverage of commercial transactions is at the
heart of the U.C.C. A determination that close stock is a security means
that the U.C.C. becomes the governing instrument for a host of transactions. Thus, the law is less subject to change and uncertainty, and the
desired objective of the U.C.C. is achieved.
Tracy A. Powell

220.
221.
222.

Id. § 8-102(a)(ii).
Id. § 1-102(2).
Id. § 1-102(1).

